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Abstract
We build a model inspired by the standard hedonic approach developed by Rosen (1974) and completed by 
Landon and Smith (1997, 1998) to analyze the price of French vaulting stallion semen in 2004. We show that 
reputation, modeled as an endogenous factor, plays a less important role than information on true quality for the 
explanation of price dispersion. This result is explained by the fact that information on studhorses is not only 
available but also reliable, insofar as the quality of a stallion is stable over time, contrary to non durable products 
like wine or cigars. This explains also why consumers on this market do not use expert opinions to make their 
choices.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Lancaster’s theory (1966) assumes that satisfaction is derived from the product 
characteristics rather from the products themselves. Thus, the consumer’s demand from goods 
and services can be viewed as a derived demand, insofar as goods and services are “inputs” to 
obtain desired attributes. On the basis of the “new” consumer demand theory developed by 
Lancaster, Rosen (1974) and Lucas (1975, 1977) suggested a method grounded on commodity 
differentiation for analyzing the “hedonic” price of a characteristic embodied in a commodity.
Hedonic price analysis is based on the hypothesis that every good can be treated as a bundle 
of attributes that define product quality and that differentiate closely related products. For any 
given good, let this set of characteristics be ordered and denoted by x = (x1, . . . , xK)’. It is 
assumed that the preferences of the consumers with respect to any good are solely determined 
by its corresponding attributes vector. Furthermore, it is assumed that, for any good, there is a 
functional relationship f between its price P and its characteristics vector x, i.e. P = f(x). This 
function specifies the hedonic relationship or hedonic regression typical for the good. Based 
on the functional relationship P = f(x), the important concept of implicit or hedonic prices can 
be introduced. These prices are defined to be the partial d rivatives of the hedonic function 
(1): the hedonic price f/xk(x) indicates how much the price P of a good changes if this good 
is, ceteris paribus, endowed with an additional unity of the characteristic xk (k=1,…,K). Thus, 
the observed market price should be the sum of implicit prices paid for each quality attribute. 
For practical applications of the hedonic relationship in price statistics, the main problems are 
to determine the characteristics vector typical of a good and to specify the hedonic function.
Hedonic analysis was used to analyze various fields, for example to explain 
discrimination in matchmaking (Vaillant, 2004), evaluation of human life (Harrant, 2002), 
measuring the social value of local public goods (Gravel, Michelangeli and Trannoy, 2006), 
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the impact of the regulation of the cable television industry (Anstine, 2006), or pricing of 
durable goods, such as automobiles [see e.g., Murray and Sarantis (1999), Couton and 
Gardes], housing [see e.g., Muth (1961), Brookshire (1981), Can (1992), Marchand and Skiri 
(1995)] or personal computers [see e.g., Chow (1967), Berndt and Griliches (1990), Baker 
(1997)]. In recent years, researchers have also apply hedonic pricing method for some 
nondurable goods, such as restaurant meals [Falvey, Fried and Richards, (1991), Gergaud and 
Chossat (2002)] or wine [Golan and Shalit (1993), Oczkowski (1994), Nerlove (1995), 
Gergaud and Vignes (2000)]. Freccia, Jacobsen and Kilby (2003) and Combris, Lecocq and 
Visser (1997) used the hedonic method to measure both price and quality on the hand-rolled 
cigars market and on the Bordeaux wine market respectively. Cigars and wines have two 
important features in common:
First, their true qualities are not known before purchase [see Shapiro (1983) and Allen 
(1984)]. In such a case, expert’s rating may be an important determinant of price [Ashenfelter 
and Jones, (2000)] and success [Ginsburgh and Van Ours, (2003)]. As a result, an increasing 
number of guidebooks and other consumer reports are available and benefit from an important 
audience (Gergaud and Chossat, 2002). In the light of Shapiro’s analysis (1983), some 
authors, like Landon and Smith (1998) in the area of wine or Vaillant and Livat (2005) in the 
area of cigars, have also shown that reputation of products may also play a substantial role, 
and influence the consumers decisions. However, as Landon and Smith (1997) stress it, the 
empirical reputation literature is extremely limited; it concerns the relation between prices and 
individual reputation [Peltzman (1985), Borenstein and Zimmerman (1988)], collective 
reputation [Jarrell and Peltzman, (1985)] or brand loyalty [Mannering and Winston, (1985), 
(1991)]. In point of fact, Landon and Smith (1997, 1998) presented an original empirical 
analysis focusing on reputation in addition to sensory quality attributes. In both papers, they 
estimated hedonic price functions for Bordeaux wine, studying the impact of current quality 
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as well as reputation indicators on consumer behavior. They concluded that reputation 
indicators have a large impact on consumer’s willingness to pay: first, an established 
reputation seems considerably more important than short-term quality improvements; second, 
the omission of reputation indicators tends to overstate the impact of current quality on 
consumer behavior.
The second important feature that wines and cigars have in common is that not only 
true quality can not be observed before purchase, but it is likely to change each year, due to 
meteorological factors or other exogenous factors influencing production. How do consumers 
behave in the presence of information on a product featured by a less unstable quality? Does 
reputation play the same role? What is the importance attached to expert opinion in such a 
circumstance? In this paper, we try to answer these questions by analyzing the French stallion 
vaulting semen market. We build a model inspired by the standard hedonic approach 
developed by Rosen (1974) and completed by Landon and Smith (1997, 1998). In this 
perspective, the equilibrium price iP  of the stallion semen, given in euros, is assumed to be a 
function of its genetic quality, its reputation and other characteristics. In the spirit of Nelson, 
Siegfried and Howell (1992), who explore the relationship between a differentiated brand’s 
market share and its price in the context of a model that recognizes the endogeneity of the 
brand’s advertising behavior and pricing decisions, reputation is modeled as an endogenous 
factor in our model. The data we use stem from two related sources, available in the 
bookstores: Le guide des étalons 2004 (“The stallions guide 2004”) and L’éperon: hors série 
de l’élevage 2004 (“The spur: horse breeding in 2004, special edition”). The data concern the 
215 studhorses on the French market in 2004.
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we describe the empirical model and 
the data. Estimation results are discussed in Section 3. Section 4 concludes.
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2. EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION AND DATA
The equation describing the price iP  of the semen of a stallion i  takes the following 
form:
( ) 1, , ,i i i i i iP p Q RS X Z = +     (1)
where 1i  is a random term with usual properties.
The variable iQ  designates the genetic quality of the stallion i . More precisely, iQ  is 
a genetic cumulative index named BLUP (“Best Linear Unbiased Predictor”), calculated by 
Les Harras Nationaux (The French public stud farm). This index takes into account the 
vaulting performances of the related of the stallion (ancestral, descendants and collaterals) and 
its own annual vaulting performances, but the method of calculus is not disclosed. In the data, 
no information can be used to distinguish the performances the stallion itself from those of its 
related. The stallions whose BLUP is positive are assumed to improve equines ( in the sample, 
only one stallion is not in this case). This variable is associated with a coefficient comprised 
between 0 and 1, indicating the reliability of the genetic quality index. It is commonly 
admitted that the quality index can be considered as a good one if and only if the coefficient 
exceeds 0.60. Only stallions in this case will be considered in the estimations presented above.
The variable iRS  measures the demand for the reproductive services provided by the 
stallion, i.e. the number of successful coverings it realized before the year 2004. This variable 
is built as the product of the total number of coverings ( iNC ) and the rate of fertility ( iF ), 
assumed to measure the empirical probability of success of a covering. iRS  may be used as 
an estimation of the reputation of the stallion, insofar as good reputed stallions will be more 
required by buyers, other things equal.
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Four variables relating to specific qualities are included in the vector iX . These ones, 
coded by experts of “Le guide de l’élevage 2004” on a scale of 1 to 5, concern the 
conformation of the stallion, its temperament (is the stallion more or less good- or ill-
natured?), its style in vaulting (its ability to jump) and its strength and potency (its physical 
abilities and the tension of its back). Finally iZ  is a vector of “taste factors” measured by 
dummy variables, coded as 1 if the stallion belongs to a French public stud farm ( iFPSF ), to 
a French private horse breeder ( iFRPHB ), or to a foreign private horse breeder ( iFOPHB ). 
Definitions and descriptive statistics are shown in Table 1.
[Table 1]
While the quality iQ  of a stallion is necessarily a given (exogenous) factor, insofar as 
it is not possible to distinguish the sports quality of the stallion from the sports quality of its 
related, on the other hand the reputation variable iRS  may be treated as an endogenous factor. 
Thus, we model the total number of mares the stallion serviced, i.e. the demand for the 
reproductive services it provides, as a function of the total number of coverings realized 
before the year 2004 ( iNC ), its age ( iAge ) and its genetic quality ( iQ ). The equation 
describing the reputation iRS takes the following form:
( ) 2, ,i i i i iRS r NC Age Q = +     (2)
where 2i  is a random term with usual properties.
We introduced the total number of coverings as independent variable in Equation (2) 
insofar as stallions that serviced a greater number of mares should logically be featured by a 
higher number of successful coverings. The presence of the age variable controls for the fact 
that the older the stallion, the more it has reproduced. Finally, we assume that stallions 
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featured by a high genetic quality level are more demanded. Descriptive statistics and 
definitions are shown in Table 2.
[Table 2]
The price variable is not included as a regressor in Equation (2) because it designates 
the price of the stallion semen in 2004, and yet the reputation variable is built following a 
cumulative index. Moreover, we do not have information about the price evolution of the 
stallions.
The relation between price and reputation can be analyzed by jointly estimating a 
system of the price equation (1) and the reputation equation (2). The hedonic price equation 
contains an endogenous variable among the explanatory variables (the number of successful 
coverings). All dependent variables are explicitly endogenous to the system and are treated as 
being correlated with the disturbances in the system’s equations ( 1i  and 2i ). All other
variables in the system are treated as exogenous to the system and uncorrelated with the 
disturbances. Estimation is via two-stage least squares (2SLS). We performed tests suggested 
by Hausman (1978) of these full models and discovered that we could not reject that OLS is 
an adequate estimating method.
3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION.
Because the genetic quality index of the stallion and its specific qualities coded by 
experts are correlated (see Table 3), three systems were estimated (noted System SI, System 
SII and System SIII).
[Table 3]
Estimation results of System SI are shown in Table 4a. In System SII, the coding 
variables 1iX , 
2
iX , 
3
iX  and 
4
iX  have been removed from Equation (1), whereas the variable 
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iQ  has been removing from Equation (1) in System SIII. Estimation results are shown in 
Table 4b.
[Table 4a]
[Table 4b]
The coefficients of the price equation measure the partial derivatives of Equation (1) 
with respect to each characteristic, i.e. the marginal willingness to pay of consumers for each 
characteristic. It appears that the genetic quality of a stallion has a statistically significant 
positive effect on the price of its semen (+35€ by further index unit), both in OLS and 2SLS 
specifications. This means that the price difference between a stallion whose BLUP is equal to 
zero and a very “good” stallion, for example a stallion whose BLUP is equal to 30, is almost 
1050€. This difference is higher when the specific quality indicators are suppressed from 
Equation (1) (this estimated value of the coefficient is then +49€), confirming one of the 
findings of Landon and Smith (1997, 1998): the omission of reputation indicators tends to 
overstate the impact of current quality on consumer behaviour. The suppression of the 
variables included in the vector iX  also increases the estimated value of the impact of 
reputation index on price, suggesting that fertile stallions are more demanded: the measured 
effect changes significantly from 1 to 1.4. Let consider the first column of Table 4a: a one-
point increase in the genetic quality index has the same impact on price than 33 further 
successful coverings (35.81€ vs. 35.64€). In other words, insofar as the scales of the number 
of successful coverings and quality index are very different (see Table 1), this means that true 
quality is a more important factor than reputation in the explanation of price on the French 
vaulting stallion market. Genetics being featured by radical uncertainty, this result proves that 
expectations of consumers on this market result from scientific information rather than from 
induced experience. Let remark that estimates of Equation (2) (both in Table 4a and Table 4b) 
confirm that the genetic quality of a stallion play a positive (but statistically insignificant) role 
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9
in the explanation of the reputation of a stallion (almost +0.28€ by further BLUP unit). The 
age of older stallions seems not significantly correlated with the number of successful 
coverings. Finally, and logically, stallions that serviced a greater number of mares are 
logically featured by a higher number of successful coverings (let remark that the t-ratio is 
enormous: 105.03).
It appears that the price of the semen of a stallion significantly increases between 260€ 
and 328€ by further evaluation unity of strength. Other quality characteristics coded by 
experts (conformation, temperament and style) play also a positive role in the explanation of 
price, but these ones are not statistically significant. This proves that consumers do not use 
information provided by experts to make their choices when information linked to objective 
characteristics (genetic quality) and/or reputation are available.
Finally, Table 3 confirms that the price of semen provided by French public stud farm 
is (often significantly) lower than those provided by foreign private horse breeders. A price 
difference may also be deduced between foreign private horse breeders and French private 
horse breeders, but this one is never statistically significant. Due to the little number of 
observations related to foreign private horse breeders, the main information from the analysis 
of estimates of the variables iFPSF  and iFRPHB  in Tabl  3 is that semen of stallions from 
French public stud farm is less costly that semen of stallions from French private horse 
breeders. This difference may be explained by the fact that private owners bear the expenses 
of the equipment to carry out covering, contrary to French public stud farm, subsidized by 
taxpayers. Moreover, it is likely that public and private owners have not the same objective, 
insofar as French public stud farm try explicitly to improve equines. Thus, they do not use a 
discrimination based on price, but select their clients on the basis of the characteristics of their 
brood mare.
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4. CONCLUDING REMARKS.
Our results do partly confirm the findings of Landon and Smith (1997, 1998). On the 
one hand, using a radically different dataset we show that the omission of reputation 
indicators tends to overstate the impact of current quality on consumer behaviour. On the 
other, it seems that reputation is less important than information on quality on the French 
vaulting stallion semen market. This phenomenon may easily be explained thanks to 
Shapiro’s analysis: the concept of reputation defined as a quality indicator is only evident in 
an imperfect information environment. Nevertheless, in the stallion semen market the 
information on studhorses is not only available but also reliable, insofar as the quality of a 
stallion is stable over time, contrary to products like wine or cigars. This explains also why 
consumers on this market do not use expert opinions to make their choices.
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TABLES
Table 1. Definitions and descriptive statistics of the variables used in the price equation.
Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev.
iP
 Price of the covering, in euros 1094.25 879.73
iQ  Expert rating of the genetic value of the stallion 18.44 6.67
iC
 Number of coverings before 2004 369.35 348.95
1
iX
 Scale (1-5) measuring the conformation of the stallion 3.749 0.582
2
iX
 Scale (1-5) measuring the temperament of the stallion 3.961 0.685
3
iX
 Scale (1-5) measuring the style of the stallion 3.985 0.567
4
iX
 Scale (1-5) measuring the strength and the tension of the stallion’s back 3.966 0.669
iFPSF
 Belongs to a French public stud farm =1; other =0 0.455 0.499
iFRPHB
 Belongs to a French private horse breeder =1; other =0. 0.485 0.501
iFOPHB
 Belongs to a foreign private horse breeder =1; other =0. 0.05 0.238
Table 2. Definitions and descriptive statistics of the variables used in the reputation equation.
Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev.
iF
 Rate of successful coverings 0.653 6.141
iAge
 Age of the stallion in 2004, in years 14.535 4.937
Table 3. Spearman correlation matrix.
iQ 1iX 2iX 3iX 4iX
iQ 1
1
iX
-.1045 1
2
iX
.1030 .1056 1
3
iX
.2889* .1205 .3682* 1
4
iX
.2507* .0043 .1374 .3967* 1
*: significant at the 1% level.
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Table 4a. Estimation results (System SI).
2SLS OLS
Coef. t Coef. t
   Price equation
iRS 1.08 3.53*** 1.03 3.38***
iFPSF
-986.78 -1.7* -971.41 -1.67
iFRPHB
-216.16 -0.38 -205.10 -0.36
iQ 35.81 2.93*** 35.77 2.93***
1
iX 168.77 1.3 173.46 1.34
2
iX 58.49 0.54 63.45 0.59
3
iX 205.24 1.36 206.47 1.37
4
iX 260.04 2.27** 263.24 2.3**
Intercept -1958.48 -1.93* -2007.68 -1.98**
Adjusted R² .494 .494
Fisher 13.91 (.00) 13.78 (.00)
Hausman 2.42 (.12)
   Successful covering equation
iS
.72 105.03*** .72 112.07***
iAge
-.49 -1.02 -.53 -1.15
iQ
.28 .72 .25 .74
Intercept -19.32 -1.84* -19.77 -2.06**
Adjusted R² .989 .989
Fisher 3698.84 (.00) 4192.13 (.00)
*: significant at the 10% level; **: significant at the 5% level; ***: significant at the 1% level.
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Table 4b. Estimation results (System SII and System SIII).
2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS
Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t
   Price equation
iRS 1.39 4.97*** 1.34 4.81*** 1.06 3.35*** 0.99 3.17***
iFPSF
-1383.09 -2.37** -1374.76 -2.36** -833.91 -1.39 -807.20 -1.35
iFRPHB
-398.41 -0.68 -391.40 -0.67 -99.75 -.17 -85.77 -0.15
iQ 49.63 4.32*** 49.76 4.33***
1
iX 133.69 1.00 153.74 1.18
2
iX 60.32 .54 67.62 0.61
3
iX 321.95 2.14** 326.46 2.18**
4
iX 328.41 2.84*** 325.40 2.83***
Intercept 710.01 1.19 718.59 1.2 -2077.52 -1.99** -2181.15 -2.1**
Adjusted R² .434 .415 .455 .421
Fisher 23.24 22.85 13.75 13.66
Hausman 3.48 (.06)
inconsisten
t
   Successful coverings equation
iS
.715 107.88*** .72 112.07*** .72 105.03*** .72 112.07***
iAge
-.50 -1.05 -.53 -1.15 -.49 -1.02 -.53 -1.15
iQ
.33 .86 .25 .74 .27 .72 .25 .74
Intercept -19.36 -1.85* -19.77 -2.06** -19.32 -1.84* -19.77 -2.06**
Adjusted R² .989 .989 .989 .989
Fisher 3905.9
4192.13 
(.00) 3698.74
4192.13 
(.00)
*: significant at the 10% level; **: significant at the 5% level; ***: significant at the 1% level.
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